{"id":13022,"date":"2023-12-19T15:47:12","date_gmt":"2023-12-19T15:47:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/2023\/12\/19\/how-online-scam-warlords-have-made-china-start-to-lose-patience-with-myanmars-junta\/"},"modified":"2023-12-19T15:47:12","modified_gmt":"2023-12-19T15:47:12","slug":"how-online-scam-warlords-have-made-china-start-to-lose-patience-with-myanmars-junta","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/2023\/12\/19\/how-online-scam-warlords-have-made-china-start-to-lose-patience-with-myanmars-junta\/","title":{"rendered":"How online scam warlords have made China start to lose patience with Myanmar\u2019s junta"},"content":{"rendered":"<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      In the end it was the thriving online scam centers that finally forced China to lose patience with Myanmar\u2019s brutal military rulers.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      The impoverished Southeast Asian nation has long been a trouble spot on China\u2019s southwestern border. For decades Beijing\u2019s leaders have played a careful game of backing Myanmar\u2019s military regimes \u2013 lending them much-needed economic, military and diplomatic support, including at the United Nations \u2013 whilst also maintaining close ties to powerful rebel militias along its borders.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      But Beijing\u2019s frustration has been building with Naypyidaw\u2019s generals who seized power in 2021, overthrowing a democratically elected government that Beijing had built close relations with, and resurrecting the kind of isolated junta rule that Myanmar\u2019s people had spent decades living under.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      The deeply unpopular regime has since been busy fighting a vicious civil war, struggling to govern growing swathes of its territory or deliver on Beijing\u2019s economic and strategic interests there, including an ambitious infrastructure corridor aimed at connecting China\u2019s landlocked southwest with the Indian Ocean.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      In recent months, that displeasure has reached new heights as the junta dragged its feet on a pressing security priority for Beijing: shutting down the infamous online scam centers that have proliferated along its border with Myanmar.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      The country\u2019s mountainous borderlands have long been a haven for gambling, drugs and the trafficking of both\u00a0humans and wildlife. But since the Covid-19 pandemic, online scam operations \u2013 many run by Chinese organized crime bosses \u2013 have flourished.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      In heavily guarded compounds controlled by local warlords, tens of thousands of people, mainly Chinese, have been trapped and forced by criminal gangs to defraud strangers with sophisticated schemes over the internet.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      Beijing has pressed Myanmar\u2019s military government to rein in the scam operations with little success.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      Things started to change in late October, when an alliance of ethnic rebel groups launched a\u00a0major offensive \u2013 dubbed Operation 1027 \u2013\u00a0against the junta.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      As the ethnic militias captured towns and military posts in the northern Shan state, numerous scam compounds near the Chinese border were liberated. Thousands of trafficked victims have been sent back to China, along with suspected ringleaders, according to Chinese authorities and the triumphant militias.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      Powerful warlord families, backed by the junta and once deemed untouchable by the law, are now in the custody of Chinese police.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      \u201cChina has been leveraging Operation 1027 in order to maximize pressure on the military regime to compel it to begin a crackdown on cross-border crime that targets Chinese nationals,\u201d said Jason Tower, Myanmar country director of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP).  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      Last week, Beijing said it helped the junta broker a temporary ceasefire with the rebels, after arranging for the two sides to meet in China for peace talks.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      But Beijing\u2019s assistance has carried a heavy price tag \u2013 the downfall of the remaining crime families the junta had relied on to rule the border region.  <\/p>\n<h2 class=\"subheader\">    \u2018Tacit support\u2019<\/h2>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      China\u2019s growing frustration with the junta over its failure to tackle the scam industry was not lost on the ethnic rebels as they planned their attack for October 27.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      In announcing the offensive, the armed ethnic groups \u2013 collectively called the Three Brotherhood Alliance \u2013 cited the need to take out the massive scam operations as a major justification.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      The alliance pledged to not only overthrow the military dictatorship, but also \u201ceradicate telecom fraud, scam dens and their patrons nationwide, including in areas along the China-Myanmar border\u201d \u2013 a message experts say was clearly intended for Beijing.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      China began publicly pushing the junta to crack down on cross-border crime targeting Chinese nationals in May, when then Foreign Minister Qin Gang visited Myanmar\u2019s capital Naypyidaw and raised the issue with army chief Gen. Min Aung Hlaing.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      \u201cFor that to fall on deaf ears for several months, and for the criminal activity to continue, I think it ultimately played a role in China giving some tacit support to Operation 1027,\u201d said Tower, the expert at USIP.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      For much of this year, Chinese officials have urged the ethnic armed groups to restrain from escalating the conflict and to sit down for negotiations with the military \u2013 which led to a few meetings between the two sides, according to Tower.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      \u201cThis seems to have changed pretty dramatically after October. China\u2019s frustration (with the junta) is ultimately what led to it lifting that pressure. And once that pressure was lifted, something like Operation 1027 became possible,\u201d he said.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      One key hub for the scam syndicates was\u00a0Kokang, a region home to many ethnic Han Chinese and controlled by the Myanmar military through the Kokang Border Guard Force. The militia was established by junta chief Min Aung Hlaing to rule Kokang after he led a military operation in 2009 to oust the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA).  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      The MNDAA, a predominantly ethnic Chinese armed group, is now a key player in the Three Brotherhood Alliance taking back territory in the region.  <\/p>\n<h2 class=\"subheader\">    \u2018Last straw\u2019<\/h2>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      Experts say a particularly brutal incident in Kokang\u2019s capital Laukkaing, a glistening casino city bordering China\u2019s Yunnan province that has descended in recent years into a lawless hub for internet fraud, was another major test of Beijing\u2019s patience.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      According to local media reports in Myanmar and Thailand, in the small hours of October 20, multiple Chinese citizens were shot and killed by guards during an attempted escape from a scam center in Laukkaing.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      Those reports soon began circulating on Chinese social media.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      Four undercover Chinese police officers were rumored to be among the victims \u2013 a claim that was shared online by Hu Xijin, former editor-in-chief of state-run tabloid Global Times.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      According to\u00a0Chinese state media, the compound, Crouching Tiger Villa, was run by Ming\u00a0Xuechang, a former Kokang official and head of a powerful family whose members hold prominent positions in the local government and junta militia.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      \u201cI think that was kind of the last straw that led to China more or less greenlighting this operation,\u201d Tower said.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      Four days after the launch of Operation 1027, China\u2019s Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong arrived in Naypyidaw. In a meeting with Min Aung Hlaing, the Chinese police chief said law enforcement agencies in both countries would strengthen cooperation to crack down on cyber scams and online gambling.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      Then in mid-November, Chinese police issued arrest warrants for Ming and his three relatives, including his son, who is a leader in the Kokang Border Guard Force. They were accused of running scam hubs that target Chinese citizens and openly using armed forces to protect their operations.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      Days later, the three relatives were handed over the border and taken into Chinese custody, while Ming reportedly took his own life before he could be arrested, according to China\u2019s state broadcaster CCTV.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      As of late November, authorities in Myanmar had handed over 31,000 suspects to China since authorities from both countries launched a crackdown on online scams in September, according to China\u2019s Ministry of Public Security. The vast majority of those suspects were handed back after Operation 1027.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      Richard Horsey, senior adviser on Myanmar for the International Crisis Group, said the crackdown on scam centers had in the short term assumed a higher priority than peace on the border for China.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      \u201cChina has calculated that it is worth a short-term period of instability and conflict on the border in order to shut down the scam centers,\u201d he said. \u201cBut I don\u2019t think China wants this conflict to continue longer than necessary\u2026(or) to spread wider than necessary.\u201d  <\/p>\n<h2 class=\"subheader\">    Peace talks<\/h2>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      In public, China has repeatedly called for de-escalation of the conflict in Myanmar. Announcing the temporary ceasefire on Thursday, a spokesperson for China\u2019s Foreign Ministry said Beijing had been making \u201crelentless efforts to promote talks to end the fighting\u201d since it broke out in October.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      But experts say in practice, Beijing had taken a largely hands-off approach until earlier this month.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      China\u2019s sudden involvement in peace talks may reflect Beijing\u2019s calculation shifting again, experts say. The rebel offensive in Shan was hugely successful \u2013 and other insurgent groups launched their own attacks elsewhere across Myanmar, spreading the junta\u2019s already stretched forces even thinner.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      \u201cChinese authorities likely did not expect that the operation would result in the complete disruption of the lucrative China-Myanmar border trade, nor did they expect that it would ripple across the entire country, causing the Myanmar military to lose hundreds of posts and suffer unprecedented battlefield losses,\u201d said Tower.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      Beijing is increasingly concerned that the prolonged disruption to border trade would deal a serious blow to the already struggling economy in southwest China, especially the border province of Yunnan; the ongoing conflict could also undermine China\u2019s energy security, as many of its southwestern provinces rely on the China-Myanmar pipeline for access to oil and gas, according to Tower.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      Those concerns have likely played a role in China\u2019s decision to help the junta broker the peace talks with the Three Brotherhood Alliance. But Beijing\u2019s help came at a heavy price.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      On December 10, the day before the military government revealed it held talks with the rebels with the help of China, the Chinese police issued a fresh batch of arrest warrants for 10 alleged \u201cringleaders\u201d of Kokang\u2019s online scams syndicates accused of fraud, murder and trafficking.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      The 10 hail from powerful families in Kokang, including leaders in the Border Guard Force that controls what remains of one of the junta\u2019s most important border zones with China.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      The most prominent figure among them is Bai Suocheng, who defected from the MNDAA and partnered with Min Aung Hlaing to establish Myanmar army control over the region back in 2009.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      Experts say China is effectively using the warrants to force the junta to quietly exit Kokang and hand the territory back to the MNDAA.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      \u201cThese warrants put the Myanmar army in an extremely difficult position. As the Myanmar army cannot control Kokang without its Border Guard Force leaders, handing them over to the Chinese side amounts to surrendering Kokang over to the MNDAA and its allies,\u201d Tower said.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      Horsey at the International Crisis Group said the ceasefire could be the final act in MNDAA\u2019s dramatic takeover of Kokang.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      \u201cThe Myanmar military is now constrained from launching any counterattack, but able to safely withdraw its forces,\u201d he said. \u201cBut there are many moving parts and whether this will result in a bloodless MNDAA takeover of Laukkaing remains to be seen.\u201d  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      Meanwhile the ceasefire already looks shaky.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      On Wednesday, the Three Brotherhood Alliance reaffirmed its commitment to defeat the military dictatorship. It made no mention of peace talks or a ceasefire.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      And fighting has continued in Shan state. The Ta\u2019ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), an ethnic rebel group under the Three Brotherhood Alliance, told AFP news agency it captured the trading hub of Namhsan on Friday, a day after Beijing announced the temporary ceasefire.  <\/p>\n\n<div>This post appeared first on cnn.com<\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In the end it was the thriving online scam centers that finally forced China to lose patience with Myanmar\u2019s brutal military rulers. The impoverished Southeast Asian nation has long been a trouble spot on China\u2019s southwestern border. For decades Beijing\u2019s leaders have played a careful game of backing Myanmar\u2019s military regimes \u2013 lending them much-needed <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":0,"featured_media":13023,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[23],"tags":[],"class_list":{"0":"post-13022","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-world"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13022","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=13022"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13022\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/13023"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=13022"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=13022"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=13022"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}