All eyes will be on Taiwan this Saturday as voters choose a new leader under the shadow of an increasingly assertive China that has spent the past eight years ramping up its threats toward the self-ruled island. <\/p>\n
The world will be watching to see not only who wins the election, but how\u00a0democratic Taiwan\u2019s authoritarian neighbor will respond. There, Xi Jinping \u2013 China\u2019s most powerful leader in a generation \u2013 has called Taiwan\u2019s unification with the mainland \u201ca historical inevitability,\u201d to be achieved by force if necessary. <\/p>\n
The last time Taiwan had a change of government \u2013 when the\u00a0ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) came to power in 2016 \u2013 Beijing cut off most communications with Taipei and significantly increased economic, diplomatic and military pressure on the island in the ensuing years, turning the Taiwan Strait into one of the world\u2019s major geopolitical flash points. <\/p>\n
China\u2019s ruling Communist Party views Taiwan as part of its territory, despite having never controlled it. While successive Chinese Communist leaders have vowed to eventually achieve \u201creunification,\u201d Xi has repeatedly said the Taiwan issue \u201cshould not be passed down generation after generation,\u201d linking the mission to his mid-century goal of \u201cnational rejuvenation.\u201d <\/p>\n
\u201cThis election marks a change in leadership at a moment when cross-strait tensions are high, and preserving stability has become more of a challenge,\u201d said Amanda Hsiao, senior China analyst for the International Crisis Group. <\/p>\n
\u201cA conflict involving Taiwan is unlikely in the near term. But if one were to break out, the ramifications would be globally felt,\u201d Hsiao said. <\/p>\n
All three candidates are selling themselves as the best choice for avoiding that doomsday scenario, pledging to maintain peace and the status quo \u2013 which polls have consistently shown is what most people in Taiwan want. <\/p>\n
But the three men hold very different visions for how to achieve that goal. They all cite the need to boost Taiwan\u2019s defense capabilities to deter China\u2019s aggression but disagree on their policy priorities, particularly how to deal with Beijing. <\/p>\n
Current DPP Vice President Lai Ching-te emphasizes bolstering Taiwan\u2019s ties with like-minded democratic partners, such as the United States and Japan, while maintaining his administration\u2019s stance that Tawain is already a de facto sovereign nation \u2013 a view Beijing deems unacceptable. <\/p>\n
Hou Yu-ih, from the main opposition party Kuomintang (KMT), places more weight on resuming dialogue and deescalating tension with China. <\/p>\n
Ko Wen-je from the Taiwan People\u2019s Party (TPP), meanwhile, has called for a more \u201cpragmatic\u201d approach to seek a \u201cnew way out in the US-China rivalry,\u201d though he has been less clear about what that means in practice. <\/p>\n
Beijing\u2019s response may vary depending on the election results, but experts say tension could rise further down the road regardless of who takes office, as China\u2019s \u201creunification\u201d plan has become a nonstarter for the vast majority of Taiwan\u2019s 24 million people. <\/p>\n
In addition to the threat from Beijing, livelihood issues such as low wages, high property prices and Taiwan\u2019s slowly growing economy are expected be key factors in how they vote. <\/p>\n
China has made no secret of its preference in the tight race, framing the election as a choice between \u201cpeace and war, prosperity and decline.\u201d <\/p>\n
Beijing openly loathes the DPP and Lai, who once described himself as \u201ca practical worker for Taiwan independence.\u201d Although he has moderated his position to favor the status quo, Beijing has continued to denounce him as a dangerous separatist. <\/p>\n
On Wednesday, China\u2019s Taiwan Affairs Office warned Taiwan\u2019s voters to \u201crecognize the extreme danger of Lai Ching-te\u2019s triggering of cross-strait confrontation and conflict,\u201d and \u201cto make the right choice at the crossroads of cross-strait relations.\u201d <\/p>\n
A victory by Lai, who had been leading in the polls by a small margin, could be quickly met with an increase in economic or military pressure by China. <\/p>\n
\u201cIn the near term, we\u2019re likely to see Beijing trying to use maximum pressure to set the terms for the next four years of cross-strait negotiations,\u201d said Wen-ti Sung, a Taiwan-based fellow with the Atlantic Council\u2019s Global China Hub. <\/p>\n
It could include \u201cintense diplomatic rhetoric that criticizes the next DPP administration, economic sanctions against targeted exports, as well as greater use of military tools in gray-zone areas as a way to register Beijing\u2019s dissatisfaction,\u201d he said. <\/p>\n
\u201cGrey zone\u201d tactics refers to aggressive state actions that stop short of open warfare, something China has used increasingly in recent years in both the South China Sea and toward Taiwan. <\/p>\n
China could also save a more forceful response for a later date, if a victorious Lai delivers an inauguration speech in May that doesn\u2019t meet Beijing\u2019s demands, according to Hsiao. <\/p>\n
The world will be watching the level of escalation. <\/p>\n
In August 2022, China staged massive war games around Taiwan to show its displeasure with then-US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi\u2019s visit to Taipei. Beijing fired missiles into waters surrounding the island and simulated a blockade with fighter jets and warships, in its largest show of force in years. <\/p>\n
If Lai wins, it will be the first time in Taiwan\u2019s democratic history for a political party to be elected to a third term in power \u2013 and serve as a potent sign that China\u2019s strongarm tactics under Xi are not working to persuade Taiwanese voters to abandon the DPP. <\/p>\n
But analysts say the DPP is less likely to secure a majority in the new legislature, which will also be elected Saturday, and that could lead to significant deadlocks in policy making, especially on contentious issues. <\/p>\n
\u201cThe check that the Legislative Yuan would likely impose on a new DPP presidency should offer some degree of reassurance to Beijing on what the Lai administration can do,\u201d Hsiao said. <\/p>\n
Beijing\u2019s preferred candidate is Hou from the KMT, which traditionally favors closer ties with China. <\/p>\n
Hou has blamed the DPP for provoking China and vowed to restart dialogue and repair economic ties with Beijing. <\/p>\n
He has pledged to revive a controversial trade deal with China, which sparked\u00a0huge student-led protests\u00a0in 2014 during the previous KMT administration. <\/p>\n
His election could lead to a temporary ease in tensions, but experts say it won\u2019t last. <\/p>\n
\u201cAfter an initial period where relations improve, Beijing will still try to seek more progress in the relationship \u2013 that could be in the form of new economic agreements or more political accommodation from a KMT government,\u201d Hsiao said. <\/p>\n
\u201cAnd at that point, I think a Hou administration would have a lot of difficulty selling that to Taiwanese voters. And that may well see tensions rise again.\u201d <\/p>\n
While Hou has clearly opposed Taiwan independence, he has also rejected the \u201cone country, two systems\u201d model proposed by China for unification. That offer has lost all appeal in Taiwan after Beijing\u2019s crackdown on freedoms in Hong Kong, which former colonial ruler Britain handed over to China in 1997 under the same framework. <\/p>\n
He described his stance of rejecting both Taiwan independence and Beijing\u2019s \u201cone country, two systems\u201d model as \u201cthe \u2018middle way\u2019 Taiwan should take.\u201d <\/p>\n
Even if Hou wins, cross-strait relations are unlikely to return to their friendlier years under former Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou, when the KMT was last in power, experts say. <\/p>\n
Much has changed since the Ma years. <\/p>\n
Amid Chinese threats, Taiwan\u2019s public has shifted determinedly away from China. Less than 10% now support an immediate or eventual unification, and less than 3% identify primarily as Chinese. The geopolitical backdrop has also changed dramatically, with China and the US locked in an escalating strategic competition. <\/p>\n
Ko from the TPP, meanwhile, has been advocating another \u201cmiddle way\u201d \u2013 painting himself as a political outsider and sensible alternative to the two established parties. <\/p>\n
As the former mayor of Taipei, Ko promoted local ties with China, especially the city of Shanghai, and stated \u201ctwo sides of the Strait are one family.\u201d <\/p>\n
But Ko is a \u201cnew face\u201d to the US-China great power competition, Sung noted. <\/p>\n
Were he to win the presidency, it would take Taiwan\u2019s relations with both China and the wider world into uncharted waters. <\/p>\n
\u201cKo has a record of strategic ambiguity for his US-China policy, that will translate into goodwill from both sides,\u201d Sung said. <\/p>\n
\u201cBoth Beijing and Washington may give the next\u00a0Ko Wen-je administration an initial grace period where they\u2019re giving it significant benefit of the doubt. Whatever happens from there is up to how the\u00a0Ko administration handles its own foreign policy and cross-strait policy.\u201d <\/p>\n\n
All eyes will be on Taiwan this Saturday as voters choose a new leader under the shadow of an increasingly assertive China that has spent the past eight years ramping up its threats toward the self-ruled island. The world will be watching to see not only who wins the election, but how\u00a0democratic Taiwan\u2019s authoritarian neighbor <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":0,"featured_media":13905,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[23],"tags":[],"class_list":{"0":"post-13904","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-world"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13904","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=13904"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13904\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/13905"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=13904"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=13904"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=13904"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}