{"id":19585,"date":"2024-05-25T12:48:18","date_gmt":"2024-05-25T12:48:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/2024\/05\/25\/irans-military-supply-line-to-houthi-terrorists-exposed-by-dissident-group\/"},"modified":"2024-05-25T12:48:18","modified_gmt":"2024-05-25T12:48:18","slug":"irans-military-supply-line-to-houthi-terrorists-exposed-by-dissident-group","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/2024\/05\/25\/irans-military-supply-line-to-houthi-terrorists-exposed-by-dissident-group\/","title":{"rendered":"Iran\u2019s military supply line to Houthi terrorists exposed by dissident group"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"paywall\">\n<p class=\"speakable\">An exiled Iranian resistance group has uncovered damning evidence showing top regime officials\u2019 direct involvement in supporting the Houthis in their attacks against ships in the Red Sea.<\/p>\n<p class=\"speakable\">Fox News Digital reviewed evidence provided by The People\u2019s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI\/MEK) that claims to show how the Iranian-backed terror proxy based in northern Yemen is supplied by Tehran. The Houthis have conducted more than 50 attacks targeting ships traversing the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden since Oct. 7.<\/p>\n<p>The MEK noted several methods and locations that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) uses to ship a variety of weaponry, including drones, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, anti-ship mines, radar equipment and communication systems, to the Houthis. They noted that some of the missiles in the Houthis\u2019 possession are manufactured by the Aerospace Industries Organization, which has been sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department.<\/p>\n<p>Adding fuel to the group\u2019s claims, a February 2024 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report demonstrates Iranian support to Houthi proxies through side-by-side comparisons of Houthi and Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles and missile systems. Among the ballistic missiles in both countries\u2019 arsenals is the Iranian Shahab-3, which the Houthis call the \u2018Toofan.\u2019\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Also included in the Houthis\u2019 weapons inventory are Iranian missiles that have been used to target Israel. The DIA report also shows the remains of what they believe was a Paveh land-attack cruise missile, designated the \u2018Quds-4\u2019 by the Houthis. The DIA says the device was \u2018fired by the Houthis toward Israel in late October 2023.\u2019\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Following Hamas\u2019 Oct. 7 terror attacks, the Houthis\u2019 first attempted to target Israel directly on Oct. 19, according to the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. On March 18, reports noted that the Israel Defense Forces confirmed a Houthi cruise missile had infiltrated Israel, landing near Eilat.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>The Israel Defense Forces did not respond to a request for comment about how many times the Houthis have attempted to attack Israel since Oct. 7, or whether they have used Iranian weaponry to do so.<\/p>\n<p>Behnam Ben Taleblu, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told Fox News Digital that despite being \u2018the newest member of the \u2018Axis of Resistance,\u2019\u2019 the Houthis \u2018actually have to date the most advanced long-range capabilities\u2019 of the Islamic Republic of Iran\u2019s proxy groups. \u2018Putting capabilities like medium-range ballistic missiles or anti-ship ballistic missiles in the hands of an actor like the Houthis tells you something about the future operations that Iran envisions for this force,\u2019 Taleblu added.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>The Houthis\u2019 recent escalations have caused the U.S. Treasury Department to once more list the entity as a Specially Designated Terror Group in February 2024. This designation had been revoked in February 2021.<\/p>\n<p>In its report to Fox News Digital, the MEK provided broad descriptions of the methods the IRGC-QF uses to deliver military material to Yemen. The MEK said the IRGC has \u2018exerted pressure on some local barge owners\u2019 to ferry weapons to Houthi boats \u201910 miles off the coast of Yemen.\u2019 On other occasions, the MEK reports that Iran may ship materials to Yemen after making \u2018stopovers in African countries.\u2019<\/p>\n<p>The report states that Iran sometimes hides weaponry inside fenders, the \u2018large shock absorbers that prevent ships from colliding with piers and other obstacles.\u2019 On some occasions, the MEK reported that fenders were anchored below the water surface at a predetermined location, \u2018and picked up by a secondary ship using built-in GPS.\u2019\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Other times, the fenders were attached to Iranian barges. On Aug. 13, 2019, the MEK said fenders \u2018up to six meters long were attached to a ship at Bushehr wharf two days before departure\u2019 to Lavan Island in the Persian Gulf. \u2018Military weapons and equipment were concealed inside these fenders,\u2019 the MEK said, but the group had no information about the cargo\u2019s final destination.<\/p>\n<p>On May 27, 2020, the MEK said Yemenis crewed a barge \u2018loaded with light weapons\u2019 from a location two miles from the port city of Jask. They also noted that the Bahman Piers, a set of \u2018about 80 or 90\u2019 secretive ports constructed along the Persian Gulf and the coast of the Sea of Oman on the 1982 orders of Iran\u2019s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, remain \u2018outside the monitoring of international organizations.\u2019 The MEK say the Bahman Piers are utilized as a means to smuggle oil and petrochemicals and ship out weapons to proxies, including the Houthis.<\/p>\n<p>In addition to providing weapons to the Houthis, the MEK explained that Iran trains the Houthis to utilize high-tech weaponry, and has \u2018helped the Houthis to develop from a ragtag force into a conventional military force\u2019 by training Houthi military personnel.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>In a February interview with CBS, CENTCOM\u2019s deputy commander, Vice Adm. Brad Cooper, confirmed that IRGC personnel are \u2018serving side by side\u2019 with the Houthis inside Yemen, \u2018advising them and providing target information.\u2019<\/p>\n<p>In addition to training, Taleblu also sees signs that Yemen \u2018has been a testing ground for Iranian weapons.\u2019 Taleblu cited one case in which the Houthis showcased a medium-range ballistic missile with a unitary conical warhead in Yemen months before the Iranians \u2018brought it into their arsenal.\u2019<\/p>\n<p>The difficulty of hindering support to the Houthis is underscored by the echelons of Iranian leadership involved in maintaining Iranian-Houthi relations. According to the MEK, the senior IRGC-QF commander, Brig. Gen. Abdul Reza Shahlai, also known as \u2018Haj Yusuf,\u2019 is charged with overseeing coordination with the Houthis. He is assisted by Brig. Gen. Ismail Qaani, Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Fallahzadeh, also known as \u2018Abu Baqer,\u2019 and Abu Fatemeh.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>The MEK also states that a headquarters within the Iranian Foreign Ministry \u2018reviews and analyzes the effects of Houthi attacks,\u2019 while IRGC Maj. Gen. Gholam Ali Rashid, commander of the Khatam al-Anbiya command headquarters, is \u2018primarily responsible for military affairs in Yemen.\u2019 The MEK also alleges that Iran\u2019s National Security Council sets the guidelines for Yemeni intervention and escalation, and that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is ultimately in charge of finalizing and approving decisions regarding political and military affairs in Yemen.<\/p>\n<p>Khamenei, Shahlai, Qaani, Fallahzadeh and Rashid have been sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department\u2019s Office of Foreign Assets Control. The Department of Justice has offered a $15 million reward for information about Shahlai for his role in plotting the assassination of the Saudi ambassador in Washington, D.C., and his role in planning an attack in Iraq in which five U.S. soldiers were killed and three wounded.<\/p>\n<p>The U.S. Treasury Department\u2019s sanctions against Iran have grown in passing years in recognition of Iran\u2019s role in funding terror in the Middle East. In April, Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen explained that the department had \u2018targeted over 600 individuals and entities connected to Iran\u2019s terrorist activity, its human rights abuses, and its financing of Hamas, the Houthis, Hizballah, and Iraqi militia groups.\u2019\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>No matter how necessary, thwarting Iranian fundraising will prove a difficult endeavor. According to Taleblu, the Islamic Republic of Iran has a well-established system capable of \u2018scaling up material support over time.\u2019 Through a combination of direct financial transfers, money laundering schemes, illicit revenue, and a nontraditional system of sending remittances that uses front companies and exchange houses across multiple countries, \u2018Iran has the ability to fund terrorism and engage in illicit financial trade across the region while under sanctions.\u2019\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Ali Safavi, of the Paris-based NCRI\u2019s Foreign Affairs Committee, urged the international community to \u2018hold the IRGC-QF accountable for leveraging the Houthis to destabilize the region.\u2019 Safavi told Fox News Digital that designating the IRGC as a terrorist entity, as the U.S. did in 2019, would \u2018not only significantly impede the IRGC\u2019s ability to use front companies to evade sanctions and fund its malign activities and proxies but also seriously hinder the operations of its agents in the West.\u2019 Most importantly, Safavi said \u2018it would convey a powerful message to the Iranian people: the main force responsible for suppressing their uprisings is recognized globally as a terrorist entity, thereby legitimizing their resistance against it.\u2019<\/p>\n<div><\/div>\n<p>Iran\u2019s relationship with the Houthis is key in its strategy to cause harm to Israel, Taleblu says. The proxy has \u2018created another vector of pressure against Israel, forcing Israel to have to expand more of its layered air and missile defense assets to protect its country.\u2019 Ultimately, the ensuing financial and military pressure \u2018would also reduce the political space for Israel to be able to accomplish freely, cheaply, or easily the military goal and the destruction of Hamas.\u2019 Taleblu also said this would ultimately \u2018create the political conditions for distance to grow between America and Israel.\u2019<\/p>\n<p>Iran can see that \u2018the strategy is working,\u2019 Taleblu says, and the world is \u2018likely going to see more weapons proliferation across the region, not less.\u2019\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>THE Associated Press contributed to this report.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div>This post appeared first on FOX NEWS<\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>An exiled Iranian resistance group has uncovered damning evidence showing top regime officials\u2019 direct involvement in supporting the Houthis in their attacks against ships in the Red Sea. Fox News Digital reviewed evidence provided by The People\u2019s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI\/MEK) that claims to show how the Iranian-backed terror proxy based in northern Yemen <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":0,"featured_media":19586,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[25],"tags":[],"class_list":{"0":"post-19585","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-politics"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/19585","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=19585"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/19585\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/19586"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=19585"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=19585"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=19585"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}