{"id":9487,"date":"2023-10-01T14:46:24","date_gmt":"2023-10-01T14:46:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/2023\/10\/01\/winter-is-coming-to-ukraine-but-kyiv-is-adapting-its-tactics\/"},"modified":"2023-10-01T14:46:24","modified_gmt":"2023-10-01T14:46:24","slug":"winter-is-coming-to-ukraine-but-kyiv-is-adapting-its-tactics","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/2023\/10\/01\/winter-is-coming-to-ukraine-but-kyiv-is-adapting-its-tactics\/","title":{"rendered":"Winter is coming to Ukraine, but Kyiv is adapting its tactics"},"content":{"rendered":"<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      Ukraine will soon face its second winter at war, and the bold campaigns of a year ago that saw significant gains in Kharkiv and Kherson seem a distant memory.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      The Ukrainian military is now waging a war of intense attrition against stubborn and larger Russian forces along a front of nearly 1,000 kilometers. It is still desperately short of air power, and offensive action will be disrupted by the deteriorating weather.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      The Russians are likely to launch another campaign to cripple Ukraine\u2019s energy infrastructure, plunging its people into a dark winter. On the battlefield, the Russians have adapted. Next year\u2019s defense budget will be 70% higher than this year\u2019s. They are in this for the long haul.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      But the Ukrainians are also adapting, after a stuttering start to the counteroffensive.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      As Franz-Stefan Gady and Michael Kofman argued in The Economist, \u201cUkrainian soldiers\u2019 ability to master Western tech quickly led to misplaced optimism that the time it takes to develop cohesive fighting units could be short-circuited.\u201d  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      Now they\u2019ve returned to a style of warfare they know best, using small groups of mobile infantry to test entrenched Russian defenses. It\u2019s also appropriate to the circumstances now, because scores of Russian drones spotted any concentration of forces and directed massive artillery fire against them.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      Small and nimble is the answer.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      Ukraine is not prepared to risk the casualties that an ambitious mechanized offensive would bring.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      This style of warfare will be less affected by the mud and mist of the winter months. \u201cThe weather can be a serious obstacle during an advance. But considering how we move forward, and we mostly advance without using the vehicles, I don\u2019t think it will heavily influence that stage of counteroffensive,\u201d Tarnavsky added.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      That style of warfare is at one end of the spectrum. But the Ukrainians are also taking advantage of western supplies of longer-range artillery, both in the south and the east. And Kyiv has dramatically increased long-range missile and drone attacks against Russian military hubs: command centers, fuel and ammunition supplies, transport hubs.  <\/p>\n<h2 class=\"subheader\">    Starve, stretch and strike<\/h2>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      The chief of the UK\u2019s defense staff, Admiral Tony Radakin, has dubbed this strategy as \u201cstarve, stretch and strike\u201d \u2013 though much of the striking is currently done at a long distance.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      Crimea has become a consistent target \u2013 the goal being to disrupt Russian supply lines and degrade the Black Sea Fleet.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      Such attacks will likely continue and escalate as winter weather makes progress on the ground still more challenging. High-profile operations, like those this month against the Sevastopol shipyard and the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet, are both a morale-booster and serve to remind Ukraine\u2019s allies that it\u2019s still on the front foot.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      The expected introduction of German long-range Taurus missiles and US Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMs) will accentuate Ukraine\u2019s focus on mauling the Russians infrastructure (though not beyond Ukrainian territory.)  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      As the online military publication WarZone observes: \u201cThe ability to deliver a 500-pound warhead with incredible force over long distances would spell big trouble for critical Russian logistics nodes and related infrastructure like bridges, as well as fortified command and control centers, all far behind the front lines.\u201d  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      Over the past few months, Ukrainian forces have focused on degrading Russian air defenses, forcing the enemy to make painful choices about what to defend, especially as more defenses have been deployed in the Moscow region in the face of a persistent and irritating (if not very destructive) drone campaign.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      If as expected Ukraine receives ATACMs with multiple warheads, it will be able to inflict far greater damage on distant Russian targets such as air bases. The head of the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine, Lt Gen. Kyrylo Budanov told War Zone: \u201cFighting Russian aviation using air defense systems is very costly and ineffective. Aviation should be taken out at the air bases.\u201d  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      Removing them is going to be a titanic task. Russia\u2019s military has learned from its mistakes.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      Nevertheless, some of the best Russian units have suffered at the hands of the growing pipeline of western weapons entering Ukraine, especially extended-range artillery and cluster munitions sent from the US.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      The UK Defense Ministry says that parts of Russia\u2019s newly formed 25th Combined Arms Army (CAA) have been deployed to bolster units in the north, essentially plugging holes in an area where neither side is making any progress.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      \u201cWith 25 CAA apparently being deployed piecemeal to reinforce the over-stretched line, a concerted new Russian offensive is less likely over the coming weeks,\u201d the ministry said last week.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      \u201cThe degree to which Ukraine can inflict disproportionate casualties and destruction on the Russians in the coming offensives will be an important measure of success,\u201d says Mick Ryan, a former Australian general and author of Futura Doctrina, who has recently been in Ukraine.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      Russian morale is hard to gauge. Ukrainian officials say many Russian prisoners of war have little sense of why they were fighting, and discipline is frequently poor. There is anecdotal evidence of this from other sources, but not to the degree that the Russian military machine would be damaged.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      However, it\u2019s been frequently (and wrongly) asserted that the Russians are running out of missiles and other munitions. True, Ukrainian officers have reported a sharp decline in incoming artillery fire in some places. But the coming winter will likely see a renewal of missile and drone attacks against Ukrainian energy infrastructure as the \u201cheating season\u201d begins.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      Last year, Russian missile barrages damaged or destroyed some two-thirds of Ukraine\u2019s energy facilities \u2013 yet failed to break civilian resolve. A series of strikes this month suggests another campaign is imminent.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      But just as they seek to degrade Russian air defenses, the Ukrainians have made strides in improving their own.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      \u201cLast year, there was no Patriot, NASAMS, IRIS-T, SAMP-T or many other systems,\u201d Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal said last week. \u201cOur air defense system has become even more comprehensive and experienced \u2026 By the winter, it will become even stronger.\u201d  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      Energy production has increased too. There are now seven nuclear power reactors working, with two more due to come online. More electricity can be imported from the EU than previously. Domestic production of natural gas has increased.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      Distribution remains a problem. Autotransformers are in short supply, and there will still likely be power outages this winter. But the Ukrainian grid is more resilient than it was a year ago.  <\/p>\n<h2 class=\"subheader\">    The long run<\/h2>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and others have spoken of \u201csteady progress\u201d for Ukraine on the battlefield, but among many western analysts and officials there is a sense of impending stalemate.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      More and more, the talk is of the conflict stretching into 2025. History shows that beyond their opening stages wars tend to ossify. That is what happened after the so-called separatist conflict erupted in Donbas in 2014.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      Ryan, the former Australian general, says Ukraine\u2019s western partners must recognize and plan for this.   <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      \u201cBy committing to support Ukraine for the duration of the conflict, the West can undermine Putin\u2019s efforts to outlast Ukraine\u2019s patrons,\u201d he said.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      US Army Maj. Robert Rose, writing in War on the Rocks, concurs. \u201cUkraine does not have the luxury of conducting maneuver (fast offensive actions). It needs to pursue unglamorous attrition, and we must be prepared to support it until it exhausts the Russian invaders.\u201d  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      Europe and the United States do remain committed to supporting Ukraine on the battlefield and with financial support. But there are signs of fatigue. Doubts and squabbles percolate.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      Ukraine\u2019s recent spat with the Polish government over grain exports showed that it is vulnerable to shifting political moods among allied countries. The election campaign in the US is underway among rival Republicans, and the extent of support for Ukraine is a divisive issue  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      The spring of 2024 is shaping up to be a potentially important phase in the conflict. Both sides will use the winter to re-tool. Then the first Ukrainian F-16s will be deployed, along with perhaps more ATACMs and other longer-range missiles (besides the growing indigenous production lines in Ukraine.)  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      That\u2019s why the supply of western arms must accelerate, according to Max Boot at the Council for Foreign Relations.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      \u201cFailing to send sufficient weaponry to Ukraine simply increases the odds of the conflict dragging on indefinitely,\u201d Boot said.   <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      The Ukrainians will also be reading the political tea-leaves in the US and among those it regards as less enthusiastic European allies, assessing the state of the \u201ccoalition of the willing.\u201d  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      In Russia, next year may see the war inflict greater economic consequences.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      The Kremlin has forced home the narrative that defense of the motherland is in an existential battle; there is no public dissent. Sanctions have hurt but are not yet crippling; the price of oil is helping to limit damage to the state budget.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      But with an economy increasingly devoted to sustaining the war machine (at least 6% of GDP will be spent on the military next year), there are growing stresses: labor shortages and inflation as well as a persistently weak ruble. Vladimir Putin will not want to cut social spending ahead of next spring\u2019s election, when most analysts expect oil and gas prices to moderate.  <\/p>\n<p class=\"paragraph inline-placeholder\">      Many variables will shape the future of this conflict next year. First, both sides must endure the mud, frost and mist of the winter months  <\/p>\n\n<div>This post appeared first on cnn.com<\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Ukraine will soon face its second winter at war, and the bold campaigns of a year ago that saw significant gains in Kharkiv and Kherson seem a distant memory. The Ukrainian military is now waging a war of intense attrition against stubborn and larger Russian forces along a front of nearly 1,000 kilometers. It is <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":0,"featured_media":9488,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[23],"tags":[],"class_list":{"0":"post-9487","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-world"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9487","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=9487"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9487\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/9488"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=9487"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=9487"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/shareperformanceinsight.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=9487"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}